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Abstract
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown
large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as
the sequence length n, are decided in an adversarial, online way. Each agent is interested
in trading a single item, and all items in the market are identical. The intermediary has
some prior, incomplete knowledge of the agents’ values for the items: all seller values are
independently drawn from the same distribution FS , and all buyer values from FB . The two
distributions may differ, and we make standard regularity assumptions, namely that FB is
MHR and FS is log-concave.
We focus on online, posted-price mechanisms, and analyse two objectives: that of maxi-
mizing the intermediary’s profit and that of maximizing the social welfare, under a compet-
itive analysis benchmark. First, on the negative side, for general agent sequences we prove
tight competitive ratios of Θ(
√
n) and Θ(lnn), respectively for the two objectives. On the
other hand, under the extra assumption that the intermediary knows some bound α on the
ratio between the number of sellers and buyers, we design asymptotically optimal online
mechanisms with competitive ratios of 1 + o(1) and 4, respectively. Additionally, we study
the model were the number of items that can be stored in stock throughout the execution
is bounded, in which case the competitive ratio for the profit is improved to O(lnn).
1 Introduction
The design and analysis of electronic markets is of central importance in algorithmic game
theory. Of particular interest are trading settings, where multiple parties such as buyers, sell-
ers, and intermediaries exchange goods and money. Typical examples are markets for trading
stocks, commodities, and derivatives: sellers and buyers where each one trades a single item
and one intermediary for facilitating the transactions. However, the well-understood cases are
comparatively quite modest. The very special case of one seller, and one buyer was thoroughly
studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite [27] in their seminal paper; they provided a beautiful
characterization of many significant properties a mechanism might have, along with an impos-
sibility theorem showing that it cannot possess them all. The paper also dealt with the case
where a broker provides assistance by making two potential trades, one with each agent, while
also trying to maximize his profit. This was extended in [16] to multiple sellers and buyers that
are all immediately present in an offline manner.
Our work considers a similar setting, but with a key difference: the buyers and sellers appear
one-by-one, in a dynamic way. It is natural to study this question in the incomplete information
setting in which the intermediary, whose objective is to maximize either profit or welfare, does
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not know the sequence of buyers and sellers in advance. The framework that we employ to
study the question is the standard worst-case analysis of online algorithms whose goal is to do
as well as possible in the face of a powerful adversary which tries to embarrass them.
We are not the first to apply techniques from online algorithms to quantify uncertainty in
markets: the closest work to ours would be by Blum et al. [9] who consider buyers and sellers
trading identical items. In their setting, motivated mostly from a financial standpoint, buyers
and sellers arrived in an online manner, with their bids appearing to the trader and expiring
after some time. The trader would have to match prospective buyers and sellers to facilitate
trade. Among a plethora of interesting results, the trader’s profit maximization problem was
studied using competitive analysis and techniques from online weighted matchings. The key
difference in our setting is that buyers and sellers do not overlap: whenever a seller appears, the
intermediary has to decide whether or not to attempt to buy the item, without having a buyer
ready to go. Instead, the intermediary stores the item to sell it at a later time. We believe this
variation is able to capture “slower” markets, like online marketplaces similar to Amazon or
AliExpress (or even regular retail stores), where uncertainty stems from not knowing how large
a stock of items to buy, in expectation of the buyers to come.
1.1 Our Results
Our aim is to study this dynamic market setting, where an intermediary faces a sequence of
potential buyers and sellers in an online fashion. The goal of the intermediary is to maximize his
profit, or society’s welfare, by buying from the sellers and selling to buyers. We take a Bayesian
approach to their utilities but use competitive analysis for their arrivals: the main difficulty
stems from the unknown (and adversarially chosen) sequence of agents. Further particulars and
notation is discussed in Section 2. All the online algorithms we design are posted price, which
are simple, robust and strongly truthful.
First, in Section 4 we study the case of arbitrary sequences of buyers and sellers and show
that the competitive ratio—the ratio of the optimal offline profit over the profit obtained by the
online algorithm—is Θ(
√
n), where n is the total number of buyers and sellers. We also study
the social welfare objective, where the goal is to maximize the total utility of all participants,
including the sellers, the buyers and the intermediary The competitive ratio here is Θ(logn).
All these results are achieved via standard regularity assumptions on the distributions of the
agent values (see Section 3), which we also prove to be necessary, by providing arbitrarily bad
competitive ratios in the case they are dropped (Theorem 3).
To overcome the above pessimistic results, we next study in Section 5 the setting where both
the online and offline algorithms have a limited stock, i.e. at no point in time can they hold more
than K items. In this model, the competitive ratio is improved to Θ(K logn), asymptotically
matching that of welfare. Finally, we also propose a way to restrict the input sequence, by
introducing in Section 6 the notion of α-balanced streams, where at every prefix of the stream
the ratio of the number of sellers to buyers has to be at least α. Under this condition we are
able to bring down the competitive ratios for both objectives to constants. In particular, the
online posted-price mechanism that we use for profit maximization, and which is derived by a
fractional relaxation of the optimal offline profit, achieves an asymptotically optimal ratio of
1 + o(1). A similar mechanism is 4-competitive for the welfare objective.
1.2 Prior Work
Our work is grounded on a string of fruitful research in mechanism design. The main topics that
are close to our effort are bilateral trading, trading markets and sequential (online) auctions.
2
The first step in bilateral trading and mechanism design was made by Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite [27] who proved their famous impossibility result, even for the case of one buyer and
one seller. The case for profit maximization was extended to many buyers and sellers, each
trading a single identical item, in [16]. Some of the assumptions in our model are based in these
two works. The impossibility result in [27], among other difficulties, slowly vanishes for larger
markets as was shown by McAffee [26]. There is still active progress being made on this intrigu-
ing setting, concentrating on simple mechanisms that provide good approximations either to
welfare while staying budget balanced and individually rational [10, 12] or to profit [28]. Other
recent developments include a hardness result for computing optimal prices [18] and constant
efficiency approximation with strong budget balance [15].
Sequential auctions have also produced a collection of interesting results, either extending
the ideas of simple approximate mechanisms instead of more complex, theoretically optimal
ones or dealing with entirely new settings. Prominent examples that compare the revenue (or
welfare) generated by simple, posted-price sequential auctions to the optimal, proving good
approximations in certain cases, are [11] for single-item revenue, [14, 30] for matroid constraints
(and some multi-dimensional settings) and [17] for combinatorial auctions. There have been
many approaches that apply competitive (worst-case) analysis to mechanism design. The anal-
ysis of competitive auctions for digital goods is explored in [6, 8] where near optimal algorithms
are developed using techniques inspired from no-regret learning. There is also a deep connection
between secretary problems and online sequential auctions [21, 20, 4]. Hajiaghayi et al. utilized
techniques such as prophet inequalities for unknown market size with distributional assump-
tions in [22]. A comprehensive exposition of online mechanism design by Parkes can be found
in [29].
There are also positive results in online auctions when the valuation distribution is unknown
(but usually known to be restricted in some way, having bounded support or being monotone
hazard-rate etc). Babaioff et al. explored the case of selling a single item to multiple i.i.d. buyers
in [2]. The case of k items in a similar setting was studied in [3], while the case of unlimited
items (digital goods auctions) in [23] and [25]. Budget constraints where also introduced in [5],
where a procurement auction was the focus.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
The input is a finite string σ ∈ {S,B}∗ of buyers (B) and sellers (S). The online algorithm has
no knowledge of σ(t), i.e. whether σ(t) = S or σ(t) = B, before step t. Also, it doesn’t know
the length n(σ) of σ. Denote nS(σ), nB(σ) the number of sellers and buyers, respectively, in
σ, and let NS(σ), NB(σ) be the corresponding set of indices, i.e. NS(σ) = {t | σ(t) = S } and
NB(σ) = {t | σ(t) = B }. Let N(σ) = NS(σ)∪NB(σ) = {1, 2, . . . , n(σ)}. In the above notation
we will often drop the σ if it is clear which input stream we are referring to.
The values of the sellers are drawn i.i.d. from a probability distribution (with cdf) FS and
these of buyers i.i.d. from a distribution FB, both supported over intervals of nonnegative
reals. We denote the random variable of the value of the t-th agent with Xt. We assume
that distributions FS and FB are continuous, with bounded expectations µS and µB, and
have (well-defined) density functions fS and fB, respectively. It will also be useful to denote
by XS a random variable drawn from distribution FS , and similarly XB ∼ FB, and for any
random variable Y and positive integer m use Y (m) to represent the maximum order statistic
out of m i.i.d. draws from the same distribution as Y . We will also use the shortcut notation
µ(m) = E[Y (m)].
We study posted-price online algorithms that upon seeing the identity of the t-th agent
(whether she is a seller or a buyer), offer a price pt. We buy one unit of the item from sellers
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that accept our price (i.e. if σ(t) = S and Xt ≤ pt) and pay them that price, and we sell to
buyers that accept our price (i.e. if σ(t) = B and Xt ≥ pt), given stock availability (see below),
and collect from them that price. So, a price pt+1 can only depend on σ(1), . . . , σ(t + 1) and
the result of the comparison Xi ≤ pi in all previous steps i = 1, 2, . . . , t. Let Kt denote the
available stock at the beginning of the t-th step, i.e. K1 = 0 and
Kt+1 =

Kt + 1, if σ(t) = S ∧ Xt ≤ pt
Kt − 1, if σ(t) = B ∧ Kt 6= 0 ∧ Xt ≥ pt
Kt, otherwise.
Then, the set of sellers from whom we bought items during the algorithm’s execution is IS =
{t ∈ NS | Xt ≤ pt } and the set of buyers we sold to is IB = {t ∈ NB | Xt ≥ pt ∧Kt 6= 0}.
Notice that these are random variables, depending on the actual realizations of the agent values
Xt.
The total profit that the intermediary deploying an algorithm A makes throughout the
execution on an input stream σ, is the amount he manages to collect from the buyers via
successful sales, minus the amount he spent in order to maintain stock availability from the
sellers, that is
R(A, σ) = E
∑
t∈IB
pt −
∑
t∈IS
pt
 .
The social welfare of algorithm A is the sum of valuations that all participants achieve
throughout the entire execution. That is, a seller at position t of the stream has a value of Xt if
she keeps her item, or a value of pt if she sold the item to the intermediary; a buyer has a value
of Xt − pt if she managed to buy an item, since the item has a value of Xt and he spent pt to
buy it, or 0 otherwise. And the intermediary, has a value of R(A) plus the value of the items
that he didn’t manage to sell in the end and which are now left in his stock. Putting everything
together and performing the occurring cancellations, this results in the welfare to be expressed
simply as the sum of the values of the sellers that kept their items plus the sum of the values
of the buyers that bought an item, i.e.
W(A, σ) = E
 ∑
t∈NS\IS
Xt +
∑
t∈IB
Xt
 . (1)
We use competitive analysis, the standard benchmark for online algorithms (see e.g. [13]),
in order to quantify the performance of an online algorithm A: we compare it to that of an
unrealistic, offline optimal algorithm OPT has access to the entire stream σ in advance. Then,
we say that A is ρ(n)-competitive with respect to welfare, if for any feasible input sequence
of agents σ with length n and distributions FS , FB for the agent values, it is W(OPT, σ) ≤
ρ(n)·W(A, σ). Notice how we allow the competitive ratio ρ(n) to explicitly depend on the input’s
length, so that we can perform asymptotic analysis as W(OPT, σ) and n tend to infinity. It is
common in competitive analysis to allow for an additional constant in the right hand side of the
above expression, that does not depend in the input, and which intuitively can capture some
initial configuration disadvantage of the online algorithm. We do that for the case of the profit
objective, as this constant will have a very natural interpretation: you can think of it as the
maximum amount of deficit on which an online algorithm can run at any point in time, since
an adversary can always stop the execution at any time he wishes. Given that interpretation,
it makes sense to allow for this constant to depend on seller distribution FS , since even when
we face a single seller at the first step we expect to spend an amount that depends on the
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realization of her value. Thus, we will say that an online algorithm is ρ(n)-competitive with
respect to welfare, if for any input sequence of agents σ and any probability priors FS , FB,
R(OPT, σ) ≤ ρ(n) · R(A, σ) +O(µS). (2)
3 Distributional Assumptions
Throughout most of the paper we will make some assumptions on the distributions FB, FS
from which the buyer and seller values are drawn. In particular, we will assume that FB has
monotone hazard rate (MHR), i.e. log(1 − FB(x)) is concave, and that FS is log-concave, i.e.
logFS(x) is concave. For convenience, we will collectively refer to both the above constraints
as regularity. These conditions are rather standard in the optimal auctions literature, and
they encompass a large class of natural of distributions including e.g. exponential, uniform and
normal ones. Notice that distributions that satisfy the above conditions also fulfil the regularity
requirements introduced in the seminal paper Myerson and Satterthwaite [27] for the single-
shot, one buyer and one seller setting of bilateral trade, namely that x+ FS(x)fS(x) and x−
1−FB(x)
fB(x)
are both increasing functions. Finally, we must mention that such regularity assumptions are
necessary, in the sense that dropping them would result in arbitrarily bad lower bounds for the
competitive ratios of our objectives, as it is demonstrated by Theorem 3.
The following two lemmas demonstrate some key properties of the regular distributions that
will be very useful in our subsequent analysis:
Theorem 1. For any random variable Y drawn from an MHR distribution with bounded ex-
pectation µ and standard deviation s,
1. Pr [Y ≥ y] ≥ 1e for any y ≤ µ
2. Pr [Y ≥ y] < 1e for any y > 2µ
3. E[Y (m)] ≤ Hm · µ, where Hm is the m-th harmonic number.
4. s ≤ µ
Proof. A proof of Property 1 can be found in [7, Theorem 3.8], of Property 2 in [7, Corollary
3.10], and of Property 3 in [2, Lemma 13]. For Property 4, from [19, Lemma 2] we know that
E
[
Y 2
] ≤ 2µ2, so s2 = E [Y 2]− µ2 ≤ µ2.
Lemma 1. For any distribution over [0,∞) with log-concave cdf F and expectation µ,
x ≤ eµF (x) for any x ≤ µ.
Proof. Fix some x ≤ µ and let c = xµ . Define the random variable Y = cX, where X is drawn
from F , and let FY be the cdf of Y . Since F is log-concave, lnF (t) is a concave function, and
so from Jensen’s inequality
lnF (cµ) = lnF (E[Y ]) ≥
∫ ∞
0
lnF (t) dFY (t) =
∫ ∞
0
lnF (t)c dF (t) = c
∫ 1
0
ln u du = −c.
So, F (x) ≥ e−c = cµµ e
−c
c =
x
µ
e−c
c . The lemma follows from the fact that
e−c
c is decreasing for
c ∈ (0, 1].
Finally, we prove the following property bounding the sum of maximum order statistics of
a distribution, that holds for general (not necessarily regular) distributions and might be of
independent interest:
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Lemma 2. The expected average of the k-th highest out of m independent draws from a prob-
ability distribution with expectation µ and standard deviation s can be at most µ+ 2
√
m
k s.
Proof. Let Y (1:m) ≤ Y (2:m) ≤ Y (m:m) denote the order statistics of m independent draws from
a probability distribution with mean µ and standard deviation s. We want to prove that
m∑
i=m−k+1
E[Y i:m] ≤ kµ+ 2
√
kms.
From [1, Eq. (4)] we know that E[Y (i:m)] ≤ µ + s
√
i−1
m−i+1 , so it is enough to show that∑m
i=m−k+1
√
i−1
m−i+1 ≤ 2
√
km. Indeed, by using the transformation j = m− i+ 1, we get
m∑
i=m−k+1
√
i− 1
m− i+ 1 =
k∑
j=1
√
m
j
− 1 ≤ √m
k∑
j=1
√
1
j
≤ √m
∫ k
0
x−1/2 dx =
√
m · 2
√
k.
4 General Setting
We start by studying the general setting where no additional assumptions are enforced on the
structure of the input sequence. The adversary is free to arbitrarily choose the identities of the
agents.
4.1 Welfare
Theorem 2. For regularly distributed agent values1, the online auction that posts to any seller
and buyer the median of their distribution is O(lnn)-competitive with respect to welfare. This
bound is tight.
Proof. We split the proof of the theorem in two more general lemmas below, corresponding to
upper and lower bounds. Then, the upper bound for our case of regular distributions follows
easily from Lemma 3 by using constants c1 = c2 = 2, and taking into consideration that, from
Property 3 of Theorem 1, the ratio of the maximum order statistic for the MHR distribution
FB is upper bounded by rB(m) ≤ Hm ≤ O(lnm). For the lower bound, it is enough to observe
that this ratio is attained by an exponential distribution, which is MHR.
Lemma 3. For any choice of constants c1, c2 > 1, the following fixed-price online auction has
a competitive ratio of at most max
{
c1
c1−1 , c1c2 · rB(nB)
}
with respect to welfare, where nB is the
number of buyers, and rB(m) = µ(m)B /µB is the ratio between the m-maximum-order statistic
and the expectation of the buyer value distribution.
• Post to all sellers price q = F−1S
(
1
c1
)
.
• Post to all buyers price p = F−1B
(
c2−1
c2
)
.
1As matter of fact, in the proof of Theorem 2 just regularity for the buyer values would suffice, i.e. FB being
MHR.
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Proof. Let A denote our online algorithm and OPT an offline algorithm with optimal expected
welfare. Fix an input stream σ. Looking at (1), the maximum welfare that OPT can get from
the sellers is at most E
[∑
t∈NS Xt
]
= nsµS , while from the buyers at most E
[
|IB| ·X(nB)B
]
≤
κE
[
X
(nB)
B
]
, where κ is the maximum number of sellers that can be matched to distinct buyers
that arrive after them2 in σ: clearly, no mechanism can sell more than κ items. Bringing all
together we have that
W(OPT) ≤ nsµS + κµ(nB)B = nsµS + rB(nB) · κµB.
For the online algorithm now, from the sellers we get∑
i∈NS
Pr [Xi > q]E[Xi|Xi > q] ≥ ns(1− FS(q))E[XS ] = c1 − 1
c1
· nSµS
and from the buyers at least
κPr [XS ≤ q] Pr [XB ≥ p]E[Xi|Xi ≥ p] ≥ κFS(q)(1− FB(p))E[XB] = 1
c1
1
c2
· κµB,
just by considering one of the κ-size matchings discussed before: if we manage to buy from one
of these κ sellers, then we will definitely have stock availability for the matched buyer.
The upper bound in Lemma 3 cannot be improved:
Lemma 4. For any probability distribution F , even if the seller and buyer values are i.i.d. from
F , the sequence SBn forces all posted-price online mechanisms to have a competitive ratio of
Ω(r(n)), where r(n) = µ(n)/µ is the ratio of the n-maximum-order statistic of distribution F to
its expectation.
Proof. Assume that the seller and buyer values are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F . Let Y ∼ F
denote a random variable following this distribution and denote µ = E[Y ], µ(n) = E[Y (n)]. Fix
an online algorithm A that posts price q to the seller and prices p ≡ p1, p2, . . . to the buyers.
Notice that this sequence of buyer prices p cannot depend on the actual stream length n, since
that is being selected adversarially.
We overestimate A’s expected welfare by assuming that it gets maximum welfare from the
first seller, i.e. E[Y ] = µ, while at the same buys for sure the item from her so that it has stock
availability to sell in the sequence of buyers. Then, from (1) its expected welfare is given by
W(p) = µ+
n∑
t=1
pi(t) · λ(pt), (3)
where
pi(t) = pi(p, t) =
t−1∏
j=1
Pr [Y < pj ] =
t−1∏
j=1
F (pj)
and
λ(y) = Pr [Y ≥ y] · E [Y | Y ≥ y ] = (1− F (y))E [Y | Y ≥ y ] =
∫ ∞
y
xf(x) dx ≤ µ.
First we show that we can without loss assume that the buyer prices are nonincreasing.
Indeed, for a contradiction suppose that exists a time step t∗ such that α ≡ pt∗ < pt∗+1 ≡ β.
2You can think of that as the maximum size of a matching in the following undirected graph: the nodes are
the sellers and the buyers, and there is an edge between any seller and all the buyers that appear after her in σ.
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Consider now the online mechanism that uses prices p′, where p′ results from the original prices
p if we flip the prices at steps t∗, t∗+ 1, i.e. p′t∗ = β, p′t∗+1 = α, and p′t = pt for all t 6= t∗, t∗+ 1.
Then, the difference in the expected welfare between the two mechanisms is
W(p′)−W(p) =
t∗+1∑
t=t∗
pi(p′, t) · λ(p′t)−
t∗+1∑
t=t∗
pi(t) · λ(pt)
= pi(t∗)λ(β) + pi(t∗)F (β)λ(α)− pi(t∗)λ(α)− pi(t∗)F (α)λ(β)
= pi(t∗) [(1− F (α))λ(β)− (1− F (β))λ(α)]
= pi(t∗)(1− F (α))(1− F (β)) (E [Y | Y ≥ β ]− E [Y | Y ≥ α ]) , (4)
which is nonnegative since α < β.
There are two options for the prices p: either F (pt) = 1 for all t, or k = min {t | F (pt) < 1}
is a well-defined positive integer that does not depend on n, in which case define the constant
c ≡ F (pk) < 1. From (3), in the former case it is easy to see that W (p) = µ, while in the latter
one
W(p) ≤ µ+ pi(k)
n∑
t=k
F (pk)t−kλ(pt) ≤ µ+ pi(k)
n∑
t=k
ct−kµ ≤
1 + ∞∑
j=0
cj
µ = 2− c1− cµ
On the other hand, it is a well-know fact from the theory of prophet inequalities (see e.g. [24])
that by using a price of µ(n)2 for all the buyers an offline mechanism can achieve a welfare of at
least µ(n)2 from the buyers, given of course availability of stock. So, by setting e.g. a price equal
to the median of F for the seller, the optimal offline welfare is at least 12µ+
1
4µ
(n) = Ω(µ(n)).
As the following theorem demonstrates, the regularity assumption on the agent values is
necessary if we want to hope for non-trivial bounds. In particular, the lower bound in Lemma 4
can be made arbitrarily high:
Theorem 3. For any constant ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists a continuous probability distribution F
such that any online posted-price mechanism has a competitive ratio of Ω(n1−ε) on the input
sequence SBn, even if the values of the sellers and the buyers are i.i.d.
Proof. Fix some ε ∈ (0, 1) and choose the Pareto distribution with F (x) = 1 − x− 11−ε for
x ∈ [1,∞). The expected value of this distribution is µ = 1ε while the expectation of the
maximum order statistic out of n independent draws is
µ(n) = nΓ (n)Γ (ε)
Γ (n+ ε) ∼ Γ (ε)n
1−ε,
since limn→∞ Γ (n+ε)/Γ (n)nε = 1, where Γ (x) denotes the standard gamma function. So, as n
grows large, the ratio in Lemma 4 becomes
r(n) = µ
(n)
µ
= εΓ (ε) · n1−ε ≥ 45n
1−ε = Ω(n1−ε).
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4.2 Profit
Now we turn our attention to our other objective of interest, that of maximizing the expected
profit of the intermediary. As it turns out, this objective has some additional challenges that
we need to address. For example, as the following theorem demonstrates, if the distribution of
seller values is bounded away from 0, the competitive ratio can be arbitrarily bad, even for i.i.d.
values from a uniform distribution:
Theorem 4. For any a > 0 and ε ∈ (0, 1), if the seller and buyer values are drawn i.i.d. from
the uniform distribution over [a, b] where b > 2a, then no online posted-price mechanism can
have an approximation ratio better than a
(
1− 1k
)4
n1−ε with respect to profit, where k = ba − 1.
In particular, for any uniform distribution over an interval [1, h] with h ≥ 3 the lower bound is
1
24n
1−ε = Ω
(
n1−ε
)
.
Proof. Fix a, b > 0 such that k ≡ ba − 1 > 1. Assume that the buyer and seller values are drawn
i.i.d. from the uniform distribution [a, b], i.e. the cdf is F (x) = x−ab−a =
x−a
ak for all x ∈ [a, (k+1)a].
Consider the input stream σ = Sn/2Bn/2, for n even.
First, it is easy to see that for any ε ∈ (0, 1) no online algorithm can buy more than nε128 1a
items from the sellers in the first part of the stream, otherwise it will have to spend more
than nε128 = ω(1). This means that the maximum profit that an online algorithm can get,
even if it manages to sell to the buyers all the items she bought from the sellers, is at most
nε
128
1
a(b− a) = k128nε.
Consider an offline algorithm that posts to seller and buyers the prices corresponding to the
1
8
(
1− 1k
)2
and 12
(
1− 1k
)
percentiles, respectively. That is, buyers get a price of p = F−1(y) =
a(yk + 1) and sellers q = F−1
(
y2
2
)
= a2 (2 + y2k), where y =
1
2
(
1− 1k
)
. Then, the probability
that the offline algorithm buys an item from a specific seller is F (q), resulting in the algorithm
spending n2F (q)q in expectation. On the other hand, underestimate its expected income buy
considering only selling to the i-th buyer the item that you got from the i-th seller. Then,
the probability of achieving a successful transaction with a particular buyer is F (q)(1− F (p)),
resulting in an expected profit of at least
n
2F (q)(1− F (p))p−
n
2F (q)q =
n
2
y2
2
[
(1− y)F−1(y)− F−1
(
y2
2
)]
= an8 y
3 [(3y − 2)k − 2]
= ak128n
(
1− 1
k
)4
.
If we consider distributions supported over intervals that include 0, under standard regularity
assumptions we can do a little better than the trivial lower bound of Theorem 4:
Theorem 5. For agent values regularly distributed over intervals that include 0, the following
online posted-price mechanism achieves a competitive ratio of O(n 12+ε) for any ε > 0:
• Post to the i-th seller price qi = F−1S
(
1
e
1
i1/2+ε
)
• Post to all buyers price p = µB.
9
Proof. Fix an input stream σ of length n. Let µB and sB be the expectation and standard
deviation of the buyer value distribution FB. As in the proof of Lemma 3, let κ denote the
maximum number of sellers that can be matched to distinct buyers that arrive after them in σ.
If µ(j:m)B denotes the expectation of the j-th largest out of m independent draws from FB, since
no algorithm can make more than κ sales over its entire execution, the optimal offline profit is
upper bounded by
κ∑
j=1
µ
(nB−j+1:nB)
B ≤
n∑
i=n−κ+1
µ
(i:n)
B ≤ κµB + 2
√
κnsB ≤ 3
√
κ
√
nµB,
where for the second inequality we have used Lemma 2 and for the last one we have used
Property 4 from Theorem 1 and the obvious fact that κ ≤ n.
For the analysis of the online mechanism now, the expected number of items that it gets
from the first κ sellers is ∑κi=1 FS(qi) = 1e ∑κi=1 1i1/2+ε ≥ 1eκ1/2−ε. So, by considering the FIFO
matching between these first κ sellers and their corresponding buyers (see Lemma 9), the ex-
pected income of our algorithm is at least 1eκ1/2−ε(1−F (p)) = 1eκ1/2−ε(1−F (µB)) ≥ 1e2κ1/2−ε,
where in the last step we deployed Property 1 of Theorem 1. So, it only remains to be shown
that the online algorithm does not spend more than a constant amount. Indeed, our expected
spending is at most
∞∑
i=1
qiFS(qi) ≤
∞∑
i=1
eµSFS(qi)2 =
1
e
µS
∞∑
i=1
1
i1+2ε
= O(µS),
where for the first inequality we have used Lemma 1, taking into consideration that seller prices
qi are decreasing and q1 is below µS . This is true because again from Lemma 1 for x = µS we
know that µS ≤ eµSF (µS), or equivalently F (µS) ≥ 1e = F (q1).
The algorithm of Theorem 5 is asymptotically optimal:
Theorem 6. If the seller and buyer values are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution
over [0, 1], then no online posted-price mechanism can have an approximation ratio better than
Ω (
√
n).
Proof. As in the lower bound proof of Theorem 4 we again deploy an input sequence σ =
Sn/2Bn/2 with n even. Let F (x) = x be the cdf of the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. This
time we argue that no online algorithm can buy more than Ω(
√
n) items from the sellers, in
expectation. Indeed, let qi be the price that the online mechanism posts to the i-th seller. Then,
the expected number of items mσ bought from the sellers is
∑n/2
i=1 F (qi) =
∑n/2
i=1 qi, while the
expected expenditure cσ is
∑n/2
i=1 F (qi)qi =
∑n/2
i=1 q
2
i . By the convexity of the function t 7→ t2
and Jensen’s inequality it must be that
mσ =
n/2∑
i=1
qi ≤
√
n
2
n/2∑
i=1
q2i
 12 = O (√cσ√n) ,
so given that our deficit must be cσ = O(12), we get the desired mσ = O(
√
n). As a result, the
online profit can be at most O(
√
n) · 1 = O(√n).
For the offline algorithm we use prices q = 18 and p =
1
2 for the buyers and sellers, respec-
tively, and by an analogous analysis to that of the proof of Theorem 4, we get that the expected
offline profit is at least
n
2F (q)(1− F (p))p−
n
2F (q)q =
n
2
1
8
(
1− 12
) 1
2 −
n
2
1
8
1
8 =
n
128 = Ω(n).
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5 Limited Stock
If one looks carefully at the lower bound proof for the profit in Theorem 6, it becomes clear that
the source of difficulty for any online algorithm is essentially the fact that without knowledge
of the future, you cannot afford to spend a super-constant amount of money into accumulating
a large stock of items, without the guarantee that there will be enough demand from future
buyers. In particular, it may seem that the offline algorithm has an unrealistic advantage of
using a stock of infinite size. The natural way to mitigate this would be to introduce an upper
bound K on the number of items that both the online and offline algorithms can store at any
point in time. As it turns out, this has a dramatic improvement in the competitive ratio for
the profit:
Theorem 7. Assuming stock sizes of at most K items, under our standard regularity assump-
tions the following online mechanism is O (Kr logn)-competitive, where r = max
{
1, µSµB
}
:
• If your stock is not currently full, post to sellers price q = F−1S
(
1
r
1
2eK
)
• Post to all buyers price p = µB.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5, but certain points need some special care. Let
κ again be the maximum number of sellers that can be matched to distinct buyers that follow
them, but this time under the added restriction of the K-size stock. This corresponds to the
maximum matching with no “temporal” cut of size greater than K. We write “temporal” cut to
mean any cut in the graph that separates the vertices (buyers and sellers) 1 . . . i from vertices
i+ 1 . . . n — that is, precisely the condition that we cannot match more than K sellers from an
initial segment to buyers later in the sequence. Lemma 9 in the appendix demonstrates that
such a κ-size matching can be computed not only offline, but also online using a FIFO queue of
length K, adding sellers to the queue while it is not full and matching buyers greedily: we post
prices to sellers, only if we have free space in our stock, i.e. when the matching queue is not
full. We underestimate the online profit by considering only selling an item to the buyer that
is matched to the seller from which we bought the item. Mimicking the analysis in the proof of
Theorem 5 we can see that the expected number of items bought from the κ matched sellers is
κFS(q) ≥ κ 12eK 1r .
Now we argue that q ≤ µB2 . Indeed, since FS(q) ≤ 1e we know for sure that q ≤ µS , and
so from Lemma 1 it is q ≤ eµSF (q) ≤ eµS µBµS 12e =
µB
2 . Next, notice that whenever we make a
successful sale, the contribution to profit is p− q ≥ µB − µB2 = 12µB. Thus, the total expected
gain in profit from sales is at least
κFS(q)(1− FB(p))(p− q) ≥ κ 12eK
1
µS
µB
+ 1(1− FB(µB))
1
2µB ≥
1
4e2
1
Kr
κµB,
where in the bound for the quantile 1 − FB(µB) we used Property 1 of Theorem 1. Also, the
profit we loose from the cost of unsold items cannot be more than Kq ≤ KµSe 12eK = O(µS).
On the other hand, the offline profit is at most κ times the expected maximum order statistic
out of n independent draws from FB, so by Property 3 of Theorem 1 it is upper bounded by
κHnµB. Putting everything together, the competitive ratio of the online algorithm is at most
κHnµB
1
4e2
1
KrκµB
= O (Kr lnn) .
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Remark 1. We want to mention here that the above upper bound in Theorem 7, although a
substantial improvement from the Θ(
√
n) one for the general case in Theorem 5, it cannot be
improved further: the logarithmic lower bound is unavoidable, since a careful inspection of the
welfare lower bound in the proof of Lemma 4 reveals that the same analysis carries over to the
profit. In particular, the last parenthesis of E [Y | Y ≥ β ]−E [Y | Y ≥ α ] in (4) will be replaced
by β − α which is still nonnegative, and also the bad instance sequence of SBn does not use a
stock of size more than 1. We try to overcome this obstacles by considering a different model of
constrained streams in the following section.
6 Balanced Sequences
As we saw in Section 5, introducing a restriction in the size of available stock can improve the
performance of our online algorithms with respect to profit. However, the bound is still super-
constant. Thus, it is perhaps more reasonable to assume some knowledge of the ratio α between
buyers and sellers in sequences the intermediary might face. This allows us finer control over
the trade-off between high volume of trades and the hunt for greater order statistics.
In this section we analyse the competitive ratio for profit and welfare obtained by online
algorithms on α-balanced sequences.
Definition 1. Let α be a positive integer. A sequence containing m buyers is called α-balanced
if it contains αm sellers and the i-th buyer is preceded by at least αi sellers.
For example, the sequence SBSSBSBB is 1-balanced, but SBBSSB is not. Similarly,
SSSBSB is 2-balanced, while SSBSBSSSB isn’t. Note that since n = nS α+1α = nB(α + 1),
we only need to know the number of buyers of a sequence. For convenience, we will denote it
by m instead of nB, as it is used quite often.
6.1 Profit
We first work on profit, deriving bounds for a variety of online and offline mechanisms. Naturally,
there are two types of offline mechanisms: adaptive and non-adaptive. The non-adaptive posted-
price mechanism calculates all prices in advance based on the sequence of buyers and sellers,
while the adaptive posted-price mechanism can alter the prices on the fly, depending on the
outcomes of previous trades.
We show that there is a competitive online mechanism for α-balanced sequences. To do this,
we compare the optimal adaptive and non-adaptive profit to the profit of a class of hypothetical
mechanisms, called fractional mechanisms, which are allowed to buy fractional quantities of
items: posting the price p would buy exactly FS(p) items or sell 1−FB(p) items. The advantage
of using fractional mechanisms is that at any point we know the exact quantity of items in the
hands of the intermediary instead of the expectation; an immediate consequence of this is that
we know in advance whether there is enough quantity to sell, which implies that the adaptive
and non-adaptive versions of the optimal fractional mechanism are identical.
We can now give an outline of the results in this section: For α-balanced sequences σ with
m buyers and αm sellers, we establish the following relations of optimal profits:
adaptive(σ) ≤ fractional(σ) ≤ fractional(SαmBm) ≈ non-adaptive(σ), (5)
the last of which will be our online algorithm. We begin by the fractional offline mechanism.
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Theorem 8. The profit gained by the optimal fractional mechanism for the sequence SαmBm
is
max m (p(1− FB(p))− α · qFS(q))
s.t. 1− FB(p) = αFS(q)
p, q ∈ [0,∞).
(6)
Proof. The profit and optimal prices can be calculated through the following optimization:
max
m∑
i=1
pi(1− FB(pi))−
αm∑
i=1
qiFS(qi)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
(1− FB(pi)) ≤
αm∑
i=1
FS(qi)
pi, qi ∈ [0,∞),
where qi and pi are the prices for buying and selling respectively. However, we can assume
that the first constraint is tight, as all qi’s can be lowered until equality is achieved, without
hurting the trades happening in the second half of the sequence. Remember, these are not in
expectation, but rather, fractions.
This constrained optimization can be reduced to finding stationary points of its Lagrange
function
L =
m∑
i=1
pi(1− FB(pi))−
αm∑
i=1
qiFS(qi)− λ(
m∑
i=1
(1− FB(pi))−
αm∑
i=1
FS(qi)).
Taking its derivative with respect to price pi we get:
(1− FB(pi))− pifB(pi) = −λfB(pi) ⇔ pi − 1− FB(pi)
fB(pi)
= λ,
which has at most one solution for any given λ due to the distribution being regular. The
treatment of qi’s is similar, leading to a unique solution as well. Thus, since pi = p and qi = q
for all i we obtain the stated result.
For other sequences containing αm sellers and m buyers in a different order, we can use the
following lemma to establish the middle part of inequality 5.
Lemma 5. For any α-balanced σ with m buyers, fractional(σ) ≤ fractional(SαmBm)
Proof. Let qi, pi be the prices set by the optimal fractional mechanism for sequence σ. These
prices have to satisfy ∑m1 (1−FB(pi)) ≤∑αm1 FS(qi), to ensure that the total quantity of items
sold does not exceed the amount bought. Thus, the prices pi, qi represent a feasible solution to
the optimization problem for the sequence SαmBm and by definition, their profit is at most as
much as the optimal.
Theorem 9. For any sequence σ we have adaptive(σ) ≤ fractional(σ).
The intuition behind the proof of the theorem is that the optimal adaptive profit is bounded
from above by the optimal fractional adaptive profit (since fractional mechanisms is a more gen-
eral class of mechanisms); since in fractional mechanisms optimal adaptive and non-adaptive
profits are the same, the theorem follows. For a more rigorous technical treatment, see Ap-
pendix A.
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At this point, we have a clear model of the adversary’s power: the fractional mechanism’s
revenue for sequence SαmBm, setting only two prices p, q for sellers and buyers. Could we do
the same online? It seems likely. After all, long sequences of buyers and sellers seem to lead to
a similar amount of trading on average by a mechanism setting the same prices.
Based on the previous discussion we propose the following online posted price algorithm:
• Use prices p, q given by the optimal fractional solution for SαmBm(see Theorem 8).
This algorithm works without knowing the length of the sequence chosen by the adversary.
Lemma 6. Let A be the online algorithm defined by the optimal fractional offline prices of (6).
Consider two α-balanced sequences σ1 and σ2 of equal length. We write σ1  σ2 whenever every
prefix of σ1 contains more sellers than the prefix of σ2 having equal length. Then, σ1  σ2 ⇒
R(A, σ1) ≥ R(A, σ2)
Proof. Assume the draws of σ1 and σ2 come from the same probability space, so that the i-th
agent gets the same draw in both sequences. We will show that all trades (or at least as many)
that happened in σ2 will occur in σ1. Let i be the index of an arbitrary buyer that was matched
to a seller in σ2 and k the number of items in stock when he arrives in σ1. If k > 0, then we
trade with him as we would do in σ2. If k = 0, we have already traded at least as many items as
σ2 at this point. To see this, note that since σ1  σ2, at least as many items have been bought
from the first i − 1 agents of σ1 than from σ2 and because k = 0, at least as many have been
traded.
Although not all sequences are comparable (e.g. SSBBSB and SBSSBB), the sequence
(SαB)m is the bottom element among all α-balanced sequences of length (α + 1)m. This is
trivial, as any balanced sequence must have at least d i(α+1)/(α)e sellers for any prefix of length
i and (SαB)m is tight for this bound.
To formalize our intuition of making the same number of trades in the long run, we reformu-
late our algorithm in the more familiar setting of random walks. Instead of considering agents
separately, each “timestep” would be one sub-sequence SαB, giving m steps in total. Thus, we
are interested in the random variables Zi, denoting the items in stock at the end of each step,
starting with Z0 = 0. Knowing the algorithm buys αmFS(q) items in expectation, the expected
profit can be given by
R((SαB)m) = (αmFS(q)− E [Zm])(p− q)− E [Zm] q, (7)
which is the revenue of the expected number of trades minus the cost of the unsold items.
Lemma 7. E [Zm] ≤
√
2mα2 logm
(
1− 2m
)
+ 2
Proof. The process Zi is almost a martingale but not quite: clearly E [Zi] ≤ αm for all i
and we do have E [Zi+1|Zi ≥ 1] = Zi since the expected change in items after that step is
αFS(q)− (1−FB(p)) = 0 by Theorem 8 . However, E [Zi+1|Zi = 0] > Zi, by the no short selling
assumption.
We can define Yi in the same probability space, where Y0 = 0, and
Yi+1 = Yi +

Zi+1 if Yi > 0
−Zi+1 if Yi < 0{
Zi+1 with probability 12
−Zi+1 with probability 12
if Yi = 0
. (8)
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The crucial observation is that Yi behaves similar to Zi but has no barrier at 0. Notice, that
|Yi| ≥ Zi for all i and Yi is a martingale.
Moreover, we have that |Yi+1 − Yi| ≤ α thus by the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality we can
bound the expected value E [Zm]:
Pr[Zm ≥ x] ≤ Pr[|Ym| ≥ x] = Pr[|Ym − Y0| ≥ x] ≤ 2e
−x2
2mα2 ⇒ (9)
E [Zm] ≤ x
(
1− 2e −x
2
2mα2
)
+ 2αme
−x2
2mα2 , (10)
where we can set x =
√
2mα2 logm to obtain the simpler form:
E [Zm] ≤
√
2mα2 logm
(
1− 2
m
)
+ 2α. (11)
Lemma 8. Let r = max
{
2, µSµB
}
. The optimal value of Programme (6) is at least m µB2er .
Furthermore, at any optimal solution the buyer price has to be at most p ≤ 4 ln(4er)µB.
Proof. Consider the value of Programme (6) that corresponds to the solution determined by
the seller price q such that FS(q) = 1eαr . In a similar way to the proof of Theorem 5, it is
again easy to see that q ≤ µS since FS(q) ≤ 1e , and so by Lemma 1 and the regularity of FS
we get that q ≤ eµS 1eαr ≤ µSr µB2 . Furthermore, for the corresponding buyer price p we have
1−FB(p) = αFS(q) = 1er < 1e and so from Property 1 of Theorem 1 we get that p ≥ µB. Thus,
the objective value of the particular solution is at leastmαFS(q)(p−q) ≥ m 1er (µB− µB2 ) = m µB2er .
Next, for the upper bound on the buyer price, consider a solution that has buyer price
pˆ = cp∗ for c ≥ 1, where FB(p∗) = 1− 1e . Then, since FB is an MHR distribution, (1−FB(x))
1
x
is decreasing with respect to x, as can be verified using that log(1 − FB(x)) is concave (see
e.g. [7]), so 1 − FB(pˆ) ≤ (1 − FB(p∗))
pˆ
p∗ = e−c. Furthermore, since FB(p∗) = 1 − 1e , from
Property 2 of Theorem 1 it must be that p∗ ≤ 2µB, and thus pˆ ≤ 2cµB, resulting in
1− FB(2cµB) ≤ 1− FB(pˆ) ≤ e−c.
This means that if we use a solution with p = 2cµB, for some c ≥ 1, the objective value of the
Programme cannot exceed m(1 − FB(p))(p − q) ≤ me−c2cµB. So, unless this value is at least
m µB2er , the particular choice of p cannot be part of an optimal solution. Thus, it must be ce−c ≥1
4er . It is not difficult to check that this requires c ≤ 2 ln(4er), since 2 ln xe−2 lnx = 2 lnxx2 < 1x
for any x > 0 and ce−c is a decreasing function for c ≥ 1. As a result of the above analysis we
can conclude that the buyer price p of any optimal solution in Programme (6) must be such
that p < 2µB, or otherwise satisfy p ≤ 2 · 2 ln(4er) · µB = 4 ln(4er)µB. In any case, the desired
upper bound for p in the theorem’s statement holds.
Theorem 10. Under our standard regularity assumptions, the proposed non-adaptive online
mechanism is (1+o(α3/2r log r))-competitive for any balanced sequence, where r = max
{
2, µSµB
}
.
Proof. Plugging (11) into (7), we get:
R((SαB)m) ≥ αmFS(q)(p− q)− E [Zm] (p− q)− E [Zm] q
≥ αmFS(q)(p− q)−
(√
2mα2 logm
(
1− 2
m
)
+ 2α
)
p
≥ αmFS(q)(p− q)−O(α
√
m lnmp). (12)
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Using Lemma 5, Theorem 9 and Theorem 8 we know that for every α-balanced sequence, the
profit of our non-adaptive online algorithm is at least R((SαB)m) and the optimal offline is at
most that of the fractional on sequence SαmBm, i.e. αmFS(q)(p− q). Thus, the second term in
(12) bounds the additive difference of the online and optimal offline profit, and its ratio with
respect to the offline profit is upper bounded by
O
(
α
√
m lnmp
αmFS(q)(p− q)
)
= O
(
α
√
m lnmµB ln(4er)
m µB2er
)
= O
α3/2
√
lnn
n
r log r
 = o(α3/2r log r),
using m = n/(α+ 1).
Remark 2. Among all 1-balanced sequences, the sequence that gives the maximum profit is not
the sequence SmBm; intuitively, by moving some buyers earlier in the sequence, we obtain an
improved profit by adapting the remaining buying prices to the outcome of these potential trades.
For example, it should be intuitively clear that the sequence Sm/2BSm/2Bm−1 has (slightly) better
adaptive profit than the sequence SmBm for large m. Our work above shows that the difference
is asymptotically insignificant, but it remains an intriguing question to determine the balanced
sequence with the maximum profit.
6.2 Welfare
Welfare on balanced sequences also improves the competitive ratio of Theorem 2 to a constant.
Intuitively, the reason is that the high volume of possible trades dampens the advantage the
adversary has in obtaining higher order statistics from buyers. As before, the fact that all sellers
start with some contribution to the welfare is also helpful.
Theorem 11. The online auction that posts to any seller and buyer the median of their distri-
bution is 4-competitive.
Proof. The algorithm buys from half the sellers in expectation, so in the end the welfare obtained
just from sellers is at least:
E
 ∑
t∈NS\IS
Xt
 = ∑
t∈NS
E [Xt|Xt ≥ q] (1− FS(q)) ≥ 12nSµS .
Following the proof of Lemma 3, let κ denote the size the matching between sellers and buyers.
Since the input is α-balanced, we are guaranteed that every buyer is preceded by some distinct
seller, meaning that κ is exactly NB. The welfare obtained from buyers is
κPr [XS ≤ q] Pr [XB ≥ p]E [XB|XB ≥ p] ≥ 14nBµB,
Adding everything together, the online algorithm gets at least 14(nBµB + nSµS). On the other
hand the optimal welfare is at most:
E
 ∑
t∈NS\IS
Xt +
∑
t∈IB
Xt
 ≤ E
 ∑
t∈NS
Xt +
∑
t∈NB
Xt
 = nSµs + nBµB.
Notice that the above theorem holds without any regularity assumption on the agent value
distributions.
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A Omitted Proofs
Lemma 9. The matching computed using an online FIFO queue of size K, adding sellers while
it’s not full and popping them when a buyer is encountered, in the proof of Theorem 7 is a
maximum one.
Proof. We show this for the limited stock case. The general case works similarly, or follows by
setting K large enough. Let Mon be the matching computed by our FIFO algorithm, and let
M be any arbitrary maximum matching in the graph induced by σ. We will show that we can
transformM intoMon using a series of changes that do not reduce its size.
Let i be the index of the first vertex that is not matched in the same way inMon andM.
That is, all edges inMon andM that are either between vertices before i, or originate at a vertex
before i, are identical in both matchings. (There cannot be any matchings that terminate in a
vertex smaller than i but originate after i due to the construction of the graph.) We will show
using a case-by-case analysis that we can changeM intoM′ so that i is matched the same way
as in Mon, without changing any edges originating before i, and with |M| = |M′|. It follows
that we can repeat this procedure until M is transformed into Mon, and thus |M| = |Mon|,
i.e. Mon is a maximum matching.
1. If i is a buyer: This is not possible. If i is matched in either matching, the edge is
originating from a vertex before i, and thus must be the same in both matchings by our
hypothesis.
2. If i is a seller.
(a) If i is matched in both matchings. Let jMon be its match inMon, and jM inM.
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i. jMon < jM
A. jMon unmatched in M. Make edge ijM into ijMon . Can’t violate K-limit
this way, as we’re making the edge shorter.
B. jMon matched in M. Make edge ijM into ijMon , and match the seller
originally matched to jMon inM with jM. We can’t violate the K-limit this
way.
ii. jM < jMon - This is not possible.
A. It is not possible that jM is unmatched in Mon, as we encounter it before
jMon , and would have matched i to it.
B. It is not possible that jM is matched to a seller other than i in Mon. Not
to one before i by hypothesis, and not to one after i by construction of the
FIFO algorithm.
(b) If i is matched inMon but not inM. Let jMon be i’s match inM.
i. jMon unmatched in M. This cannot happen. Notice that we cannot have any
buyers between i and jMon that are unmatched in Mon, nor can we have any
that are matched to sellers after i. Thus, all buyers between i and jMon are
matched to sellers before i in bothMon andM. There can be at most K − 1 of
them, as there is one more edge originating from i inMon, and a cut between i
and i + 1 has size at most K inMon. Therefore, we could add the edge ijMon
toM without violating the K-limit. ThusM was not maximum, contradicting
out assumption.
ii. jMon matched in M. Let sM be the seller matched to jMon in M. Again, all
buyers between i and jMon are matched to sellers before i in both matchings.
So we can replace sMjMon with sjMon without violating the K- limit.
(c) If i is matched inM but not inMon. Let jM be its match inM.
i. jM is matched inMon. This cannot happen due to the FIFO construction.
ii. jM is unmatched in Mon. This cannot happen. If i were to enter the FIFO
queue, it would be matched to jM (or an earlier available buyer) in Mon. If i
does not enter the FIFO queue this can only be because the queue was full. But
if the queue was full, this means that K sellers before i were matched to buyers
between i and jM (otherwise jM would be matched to one of them ifMon). So
there is K edges going from sellers before i to buyers between i and jM inMon.
So there is also K edges going that way inM, as they are identical on vertices
before i. So there is K + 1 edges going from nodes before and including i to
vertices after i inM, violating the K item limit.
Theorem 9. For any sequence σ we have adaptive(σ) ≤ fractional(σ).
Proof. Fix an adaptive mechanism and let Qi be the price posted to seller i and Q˜i be the
probability of sale at price Qi. Since in an adaptive mechanism the price depends on the history,
Qi and Q˜i are random variables. Similarly define Pj and P˜j to be the price and probability of
buying from buyer j. For the payments to sellers and from buyers we have:
E [QiFS(Qi)] = E
[
Q˜iF
−1
S (Q˜i)
]
E [Pj(1− FB(Pj))] = E
[
P˜jF
−1
B (1− P˜j)
]
.
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Summing over all agents we get the expected profit:∑
j∈NB
E [Pj(1− FB(Pj))]−
∑
i∈NS
E [QiFS(Qi)]
=
∑
j∈NB
E
[
P˜jF
−1
B (1− P˜j)
]
−
∑
i∈NS
E
[
Q˜iF
−1
S (Q˜i)
]
≤
∑
j∈NB
E
[
P˜j
]
F−1B (1− E
[
P˜j
]
)−
∑
i∈NS
E
[
Q˜i
]
F−1S (E
[
Q˜i
]
), (13)
where the last inequality follows from our regularity assumptions. Note that in the last in-
equality F−1B (1 − E
[
P˜j
]
) and F−1S (E
[
Q˜i
]
) can be interpreted as prices set by the fractional
mechanism, with E
[
P˜j
]
and E
[
Q˜i
]
the fractions of items bought and sold.
We have obtained the objective function of the optimization and it is left to a set of inequal-
ities concerning the prices, to serve as the constraints. Observe that E
[
Q˜i
]
is the expected
number of items bought from seller i, while E
[
P˜j
]
sold to buyer j. Let St and Bt be the sets of
indices of sellers and buyers contained in the first t agents of the sequence.
Let Zt be the number of items exchanged with the agent encountered at step t. The number
of items currently held by the intermediary at time t is ∑t1 Zi ≥ 0 by the no short selling
assumption. Thus for all t:
E
[
t∑
i=1
Zi
]
=
∑
i∈St
E [Zi]−
∑
j∈Bt
E [Zj ]
=
∑
i∈St
E
[
E
[
Zi|Q˜i
]]
−
∑
j∈Bt
E
[
E
[
Zj |P˜j
]]
=
∑
i∈St
E
[
Q˜i
]
−
∑
j∈Bt
E
[
P˜j
]
≥ 0 (14)
Combining (13) and (14) gives us exactly the same optimization problem the optimal frac-
tional mechanism would face for that sequence.
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